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Tariffs, subsidies and profits: a re-assessment of structural change
in Australia 1901-1939
Abstract
This paper offers a re-interpretation of the drivers of structural change in Australia from
federation until the outbreak of World War II. The broad story of structural change is that
manufacturing increased its relative share of both output and employment while the share
of the farm sector and mining contracted. The large tertiary sector, including
construction, oscillated around its mean. The conventional wisdom is that these shifts
were largely the result of government policy, particularly the increase in trade barriers
that stimulated import substitution by manufacturers. However, if the unit of analysis is
the firm rather than the economy then a wider range of possibilities come into view. We
contend that profit maximizing firms responded to changing relative profits between and
within sectors that shifted in response to more sources of stimuli than tariffs and
subsidies. These included exogenous shifts in consumer preferences and a number of
changes on the supply side: the adoption of new technologies, changing factor
proportions, and greater specialization in manufacturing and services generating positive
experience effects.

Introduction
In the first half of the twentieth century the Australian economy made a substantial shift
away from its reliance on resource-based industries. Manufacturing industry lifted its
share of both output and employment. Nearly all of the growth in the share of
manufacturing was accounted for by a reduction of the share of the farm and mining
sectors. A very large tertiary sector, comprising services and construction, oscillated
around its trend. The data sets of GDP, employment and capital formation generated by
Butlin and others1 provide the starting point for discussion. These data will be reviewed
in the first section of the paper.
The conventional explanation of the relative rise of manufacturing rests largely on the
role of the tariff. Rising levels of tariff protection enabled local producers to capture a
larger share of the market from increasingly expensive imports. This literature on
structural change will be discussed in the second section. The paper will then proceed by
arguing that the previous explanations of sectoral change do not provide a convincing
account of the rise of manufacturing relative to the primary sector let alone the rise and
fall of industries within manufacturing and the large services sector. New data of profits
at the industry level promises to provide a more accurate picture of the changing choice

1

Butlin, N. G. Australian Domestic Product, Investment and Foreign Borrowing 1861-1939 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1962); M. Keating, The Australian Workforce 1910-11 to 1960-61 (Canberra:
Australian National University, 1973); Butlin, N. G. and J. A. Dowie ‘Estimates of Australian workforce
and employment 1861-1961’, Australian Economic History Review, IX, 1969, pp. 38-55.
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set facing people making strategic decisions about where to do business.2 These data
highlight the role of both changes in output prices, as captured in the discussion of tariffs
and subsidies, and developments on the supply side. Technological change, endogenous
and exogenous, transformed the landscape of relative profitability. Much of the changing
structure of the Australian economy was the result of the emergence of new industries
founded on new production possibilities. There was a sequential dimension to this
process with the developments up stream in the generation of new sources of energy,
particularly electricity, being a precondition for changes down stream.
Structural change 1901-1939
The structure of the Australian economy altered in many ways in the first half of the
twentieth century. The big picture is a relative growth of manufacturing that is nearly
offset by a contraction in rural and mining activity with the large service sector remaining
at a roughly constant figure. National income account data of product indicate shifts in
the relative importance at a sector level.3 The broad shifts revealed by these indicators are
mirrored by changes in the distribution of the workforce.4 Research on particular sectors,
industries or regions provides evidence of absolute expansion or decline that adds detail
and nuance to the broad sweep of the aggregate data, including the shifting balance
between the size of the public and private sector.5
Together the GDP and employment series demonstrate the broad sweep of change in the
structure of the economy from 1901 up to WWII. The data is shown in Tables 1 and 2
below. Manufacturing grew significantly both in terms of its share of employment, from
15 to 24 per cent, and its share of output, 13 to 18 per cent, from a low base. Its
expansion was broadly matched by the contraction in the primary sector, a decline in
share of employment from 33 to 24 per cent and a fall in share of output from 37 to 28
per cent. Services, to which the utilities of gas, electricity and water, and construction are
added to become the tertiary sector, were the cornerstone of the economy with a largely
unchanged contribution as an employer and income generator at around the low 50 per
cent for both employment and product.
Table 1 about here
2

See Simon Ville and David Merrett, ‘A time series for business profitability in twentieth-century
Australia’, Australian Economic Review, 39, 3, September 2006, pp. 330-39.
3
Butlin, Australian Domestic Product; Idem, ‘Some perspectives of Australian economic development,
1890-1965’, in Colin Forster, ed., Australian Economic Development in the Twentieth Century (London
and Sydney: George Allen & Unwin and Australasian Publishing Company), 1970, pp. 266-327; Dowie, J.
A. ‘The service ensemble’ in Forster, ed., Australian Economic Development, pp. 208-65;
4
Keating, Australian Workforce.
5
Forster, C., Industrial Development in Australia 1920-1930 (Canberra: Australian National University),
1970; Snooks, G. D., Depression and Recovery in Western Australia, 1928/29-1938/39: A Study in Cyclical
and Structural Change (Nedlands, WA: University of Western Australia Press), 1974; Barnard, A. and N.
G. Butlin, ‘Australian public and private capital formation, 1901-75’, Economic Record, 1981, pp.354-67;
Sinclair, W. A., ‘Capital formation’, in Forster, ed., Australian Economic Development, pp. 11-65;
Mathews, R. L. and W. R. C. Jay, Federal Finance: Intergovernmental Financial Relations in Australia
Since Federation (Melbourne: Thomas Nelson (Australia) Limited), 1972, Tables 13 and 22, pp. 102 and
169.
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Table 2 about here

The data are widely recognized as robust indicators of trends. However, there are
difficulties in using them as measures of structural change. The two key references are
Butlin (1962) and Keating (1973) who constructed the long term estimates of national
accounts and workforce data respectively. These series have been subject to commentary
and revisions.6 There are a number of problems. These data rely heavily on the
Production Bulletins covering farming, mining and manufacturing and the population
Census. The very large service sector is practically invisible. Attempts to calculate its
output are bedeviled by the intangible nature of the product. Valuations of its inputs are
used instead. This places great reliance on the accuracy of the employment series in
services, which rest heavily on inter-census interpolation that masks year to year
fluctuations, and wage data that is less than comprehensive. Further conceptual and
practical issues arise in drawing boundaries between the sectors. Some authors, such as
Dowie, aggregate the nine industry classification used by Butlin to a threefold
classification, viz, primary, secondary and tertiary.7 This process involves making
important decisions about boundaries, particularly about whether mining should be
included with the rural sector or with manufacturing, and whether industries such as
construction and utilities that have tangible product should be separated from ‘services’.
If our purpose is to trace the changing structure of the economy over time then data at the
highest level of disaggregation is most useful. The industry classifications adopted in the
Production Bulletins are too broad to identify the supply side responses to changes in
relative profitability. The industry sub-divisions, akin to two-digit ANZSIC data, and
sub-categories, the equivalent of the three-digit ANZSIC data, disguise as much as they
reveal. This data was simply not fine grained enough to allow the observation of the
emergence of new industries, products or processes as they happened. The first
Manufacturing statistics were published in the Production Bulletin in 1907. From that
time until a major revision of the manufacturing sub-divisions in 1931 the number of
industries classified had risen from 100 to 115. From 1931 there were 146.8 Similar
problems arose when classifying workers amongst occupations. In his Report about the
1933 Census the Statistician concluded that ‘the taxonomic problem [of classifying
occupations] is never completely solved. It is complicated by the development of new
6

See references in note 2 above.
Maddock and McLean follow Boehm in using four: ‘farming’, ‘mining’, ‘manufacturing’ and ‘other’.
Rodney Maddock and Ian W. McLean, ‘The Australian economy in the very long run’, in R. Maddock and
I. W. McLean, eds., The Australian Economy in the Long Run (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press),
1987, Table 1.2, 19.
8
The original classification of manufacturing industries adopted by the Conference of Statisticians in 1902
remained in use until 1931. At the beginning there were 19 ‘industries’ and 100 sub-categories. By 1929-30
the number of sub-categories had increased to 115. Moreover, a number of the sub-categories had also been
moved between ‘industries’. Two of the ‘industries’, Class XI ‘vehicles’ and XVIII ‘leather’, had been
reclassified to comprise motor vehicles and rubber goods respectively. Subsequent to the revision of 193031 there were fewer industrial sub-divisions, 16, but many more sub-categories, 146. Commonwealth
Bureau of Census and Statistics, Production Bulletin 1931 (Canberra: Government Printer).
7
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fields of industrial enterprise and by the splitting and overlapping of fields previously
conventionally definable, by the emergence of new occupations, crafts and callings, [and]
by the further specialization and division of labour…’9
Explanations of Structural Change
Describing the structural transformation has proven to be more straightforward than
explaining what caused it to take place. The aggregate data captures the net outcome of
hundreds of thousands of decisions taken by businesses and households in any year. The
‘shape’ of the economy10 altered continuously as entrepreneurs, investors and workers
readjusted their behaviours in the light of a set of price signals. The most relevant sets of
information were the terms of trade between industries11 and the relative profitability of
firms between industries, the latter showing the return to investing in a bundle of
resources to produce those goods and services.
The existing literature has focused most of its attention on one set of price signals, tariffs
and subsidies. Tariffs rose from 1907 onwards driving a wedge between domestic and
‘free trade’ prices for manufactures.12 There are two indices of the ‘height’ of the tariff.
The first is a simple average of the revenue collected divided by the value of net imports,
both dutiable and total, entering the country in the same year.13 Graph 1 shows that the
average rate of duty paid on those imports on which duty was payable remained roughly
constant from 1903 until the beginning of WWI when it fell until 1921 before rising
above pre-war levels before the onset of the 1929 depression. Average rates rose sharply
thereafter, inflated by primage duty that was levied from 1931 until 1939. The ratio of
duty paid on all imports followed the same broad pattern although the percentage of
imports admitted free of duty fluctuated by rising before the WWI, falling in the 1920s

9

Statistician’s Report, Census of the Commonwealth of Australia, 1933 (Canberra: Government Printer),
Vol. 3, 214.
10
Butlin, N. G., ‘The shape of the Australian economy 1861-1900’, Economic Record, 34, 1, 1958, pp. 1029.
11
‘… the intersectoral terms of trade…governed resource allocation within the domestic economy.’ Mark
Thomas, ‘Manufacturing and economic recovery in Australia, 1932-1937’, in R. G. Gregory and N. G.
Butlin, eds, Recovery from the Depression: Australia and the World economy in the 1930s (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press), 1988, p. 269.
12
For a discussion of changes in the tariff see A. J. Reitsma, Trade Protection in Australia (Brisbane:
University of Queensland Press), 1960, chapter 2; Kym Anderson and Ross Garnaut, Australian
Protectionism: Extent, Causes and Effects (Sydney: Allen & Unwin), 1987, chapters 2 & 4. The tariff was
subject to broad revisions in 1908, 1911, 1914, 1921, 1926 and 1928 before the introduction of a host of
emergency measures in the Scullin Tariff between August 1929 and July 1931. Tariff schedules were
further affected in the 1930s as Australia offered increased preference to Britain and other trading partners
through its participation in the Ottawa Agreement in 1932 and the ill-fated trade diversion policies of the
late 1930s. The introduction of preferential tariffs from 1908 meant that the rate of duty differed according
to the country from which the import was sourced. One imported item, bottled beer for instance, may pay
several rates of duty depending on the country of origin. Furthermore, the Tariff Board, established in
1921, made numerous alterations to duties on individual items through out the 1920s and 1930s. G. J. R.
Linge, Index of Australian Tariff Board Reports 1901-1961 (Canberra: Australian National University),
1964.
13
Australia, Overseas Trade Bulletin (Canberra: Government Printer), various.
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and rising again in the 1930s.14 The simple average method has a downward bias in that,
ceteris paribus, the higher the rate of duty the lower the value of imports and so the less
duty collected. Another study has recalculated the data, using a sample of commodities
for which corresponding import and production figures are available, using local
production and imports as the denominator.15 This series, an index, shows higher rates of
increase in the ‘weight’ of the tariff than the simple average especially during the 1920s.
Graph 1 about here

Governments also altered the ratio of domestic to ‘free trade’ prices through other means,
primarily subsidies to domestic producers. Bounties and subsidies were paid to producers
in many industries. However, the farming industries were the major recipients. The form
of subsidy ranged from producers receiving cash grants through to being provided with
transport services at less than cost and price support schemes.16 A number of attempts
were made in the late 1920s and 1930s to estimate the value of this assistance.17 The
authors of The Australian Tariff calculated that the subsidy equivalent of the tariff to
manufacturing was £26m in 1926-27 while primary industries were not far behind
receiving £22m. By 1932-33, the subsidy equivalent paid to primary industry had risen to
£29m with the amount going to manufacturing having fallen to £19m.18
Contemporary economists decried the allocative effect of tariffs and subsidies.19 They
argued, in some memorable prose, that these policies distorted markets in ways that led to
a loss of national welfare. Shann, for instance, wrote in 1929 of the creation a system of

14

The impact of the revised tariff schedules was two-fold. Rates were increased and more goods were made
dutiable. Applying the 1908-11 and 1914 tariff schedules to the 1913 imports demonstrated that the average
rate on all imports was increased from 16.75 per cent to 21.48 per cent as a result of the new schedule. The
value of dutiable imports rose from £44.6m to £51.0m. Commonwealth Year Book of Australia 1914
(Canberra: Government Printer), p. 603. The same calculation comparing the impact of the 1921 tariff
schedule with that of 1908-11 showed that the average rate of duty on all imports was 22.46 per cent in
1921, little more than in 1914. However, the percentage of imports admitted duty free had fallen from 55
per cent in under the 1908-11 schedule to 42.96 per cent under the 1914 schedule to 29.12 per cent in 1921.
Commonwealth Year Book of Australia 1921 (Canberra: Government Printer), pp. 503-05.
15
A. T. Carmody, ‘The level of the Australian tariff: a study in method’, Yorkshire Bulletin of Economic
and Social Research, 4, 1, 1952, pp. 51-65.
16
See F. W. Eggleston, State Socialism in Victoria (London: P. S. King & Son), 1932; N. G. Butlin, A.
Barnard and J. J. Pincus, Government and Capitalism: Public and Private Choice in Twentieth Century
Australia (Sydney: George Allen & Unwin), 1982.
17
L. F. Giblin, ‘Some costs of marketing control’, Economic Record, IV, Supplement, February, 1928, pp.
148-54; J. B. Bridgen, et.al., The Australian Tariff: An Economic Enquiry (Melbourne: Melbourne
University Press in association with Macmillan & Co.), 1929, Part IV and Appendices N and O; and J. F.
Nimmo, ‘The effect of the tariff on the Australian consumption standard’, in F. W. Eggleston, et.al.,
Australian Standards of Living (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press in association with Oxford
University Press) 1939, pp. 118-19.
18
Nimmo, ‘Effect of the tariff’, p. 121.
19
Benham, Prosperity of Australia, chapter 5; Bridgen, et.al., The Australian Tariff; Giblin, ‘Costs of
marketing control’.
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‘faked prices’ that ‘deranges and weakens [the] whole economy.’20 Benham asserted that
‘there has been deliberate interference with the “price-mechanism,”’21 likening this to the
actions of a ‘Dictator.’22 All agreed that Australia’s comparative advantage lay in its
resource-based industries. The farm and mining industries were exporters who of
necessity accepted the world price for their products. In contrast, manufacturing and
services were sheltered from world markets, the former because of tariffs and the latter
by its non-tradeable nature. The export sector could not pass on higher costs to its
customers whereas the sheltered industries could. Tariffs raised the input costs of the
export sector so narrowing its margins. Moreover, increases in domestic prices feed back
into higher wages through an indexation mechanism.23 By the late 1920s there was
serious concern that the process may have gone too far by threatening the viability of the
export industries. The rapid increase in the level of assistance being given to the minor
rural industries even before the onset of the 1930s depression served to reinforce the
point. As Giblin so famously wrote:
The vision that comes is of Australia as one enormous sheep bestriding a
bottomless pit, with statesman, lawyer, miner, landlord, farmer and factory hand
all hanging on desperately to the locks of its abundant fleece. The limits to
protection are set by what the sheep will carry, and there are definite limits to that,
even if the threat of synthetic wool remains only a threat.24
The debate about the welfare loss associated with the tariff has continued to the present
day. Anderson and Garnaut, encapsulate the prevailing view with the statement that ‘one
of the most robust conclusions from economic theory is that protection reduces per capita
national income of a small economy.’25 The analysis undertaken by Bridgen and his coauthors has been revised over the years by more formal and increasingly sophisticated
modeling.26 This literature that draws heavily from international trade theory passes over
the issue of the mechanism by which tariffs caused manufacturing to grow relative to the
rest of the economy in terms of the resources it used and its share of product.
The link between tariffs and subsidies and the relative expansion of manufacturing in the
economy is made most clearly by Benham. Tariffs result in higher domestic prices than
would be the case under free trade and also permit the manufacturer to pay higher money
wages. He argues that ‘“protected” industries are thus rendered more profitable, and more
capital and labour therefore flows towards them, than would be the case under free
20

E. Shann, An Economic History of Australia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1948, p.447.
Benham, Prosperity of Australia, p. 139.
22
Benham, Prosperity of Australia, p. 137.
23
Keith Hancock, ‘The first half century of Australian wage policy – Part 2’, Journal of Industrial
Relations, 21, 1979, pp. 129-60.
24
Giblin, ‘Costs of marketing control’, p.154.
25
Kym Anderson and Ross Garnaut, Australian Protectionism: Extent, Causes and Effects (Sydney: Allen
& Unwin), 1987, p. 12.
26
William Coleman, Selwyn Cornish and Alf Hagger, Giblin’s Platoon: The Trials and Triumph of the
Economist in Australian Public Life (Canberra: ANU E Press), 2006, pp. 56-73 & 8083; Rod Tyers and
William Colman, ‘Beyond Brigden: Australia’s pre-war manufacturing tariffs, real wages and economic
size’, presented at conference on: Globalisation in Asia and the Pacific before the Modern Era, Australian
National University, 30 June – 1 July 2005; Prema-chandra Athukorala and Satish Chand, ‘Tariff-growth
nexus in the Australian economy, 1870-2002: Is there a paradox?’, unpublished paper.
21
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trade.’27 Moreover, ‘…labour and resources are deliberately diverted away from nonprotected industries and towards protected industries, or, broadly speaking, away from
Primary Production and towards Manufacturing.’28 The question is how much of the shift
towards manufacturing was the result of such policies? Benham equivocates noting that
the share of workers in the primary sector had fallen secularly in advanced economies as
a result of technological change. He concludes that the tariff had really operated at the
margin, as under free trade ‘Manufacturing would have expanded to a somewhat smaller
extent, and in a somewhat different way.’29 The structure of manufacturing was altered as
‘labour and resources were diverted to the more highly protected Manufacturing
industries.’30
This proposition can be tested with two sets of data. The first draws on information about
the average rate of duty for 76 sub-categories of manufacturing industries, the equivalent
of three-digit ANZSIC, for the year 1932-33.31 The sample covers 66 per cent of the
industry sub-categories and contains 51 per cent of total employment. We tested the
relationship between the height of the tariff, as measured by the simple average of
customs duty paid divided by the value of imports, and the numbers employed in each of
the industries receiving protection. Conventional regression analysis showed that the
errors were not normally distributed. The regression was re-run having logged the data.
The null hypothesis that there is no association between tariff levels and the size of
resources in an industry, using employment as a proxy, was rejected. The t statistic is
1.834055 and the P-value 0.070612, which is slightly beyond the 5 per cent limit.
However, the adjusted R2 is only 3 per cent, so we can conclude that no significant
explanatory relationship existed between tariffs and employment. The results are shown
in full in Appendix 1.
However, this test does not capture other influences that might effect employment by
industries. Another test was undertaken to test the relationship between changes in tariff
levels and changes in employment for a smaller set of industries. This procedure was
possible because of data that aligns ‘industry’ employment data with corresponding tariff
‘rates’ at the two-digit ANZSIC level. From 1919 the Statistician published data that
allocates imports to appropriate class of the customs’ schedules.32 We have selected ten
manufacturing ‘industries’ that best approximate the activities covered by the customs
classifications in 1918-19, 1928-29 and 1938-39.33 These industries account for 85, 87
27

Benham, Prosperity of Australia, p. 138.
Benham, Prosperity of Australia, p. 139.
29
Benham, Prosperity of Australia, p. 146. Emphasis in the original.
30
Benham, Prosperity of Australia, p.162.
31
Nimmo, ‘The effect of the tariff’, Appendix B, pp. 154-57. Only those industries were selected for whom
matching employment data could be found in the Production Bulletin 1932-33, Table 110, pp. 77-81.
32
The classifications used by the Statistician with respect to manufacturing output and employment,
imports and duty payable in the Production Bulletin and Overseas Trade Bulletin differ significantly.
33
They are, using the 1928-29 Production Bulletin classifications, ‘Stone, clay and glass’, ‘Oils and fats’
and ‘Drugs and chemicals’, Metal works, machinery’, ‘Jewellery’, ‘Clothing and textiles’, ‘Leather’, ‘Food
and drink’, ‘Working in wood’ and ‘Furniture, bedding’, and ‘Musical instruments’. The corresponding
Customs classifications are ‘Earthenware, cement, china, glass and stone’, ‘Drugs and chemicals’ and
‘Oils, paints and varnishes’, ‘Metals and machinery’, ‘Jewellery and fancy goods’, ‘Textiles’, ‘Hides,
leather and rubber’, ‘Agricultural products and groceries’, ‘Wood, wicker and cane’, ‘Paper and stationery,
28
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and 91 per cent of all manufacturing employment at those dates. Multiple regression
analysis is employed to determine the extent of causality. Changes in the average rate of
duty between 1918-19 and 1928-29 and then between 1928-29 and 1938-39 are the
independent variables. Changes in employment, as a proxy for resources used in each
industry, for the same periods are the dependent variable. Each industry has a dummy
variable. The null hypothesis that there is no relationship is confirmed as the t statistics is
-0.707929 and the P-value 0.496912, well beyond the 5 per cent limit. The results are
shown in full in Appendix 11.34
Further doubt has been cast on the link between changes in tariff rates and the expansion
of manufacturing by Mark Thomas in his study of recovery from the 1930s depression.35
His analysis of the role of import substitution as a contributor to output growth
throughout the inter-war period demonstrates that there was no simple relationship
between increases in tariffs, and devaluation, and declining import penetration. The 1921
tariff and further revisions in 1926 and 1928 did not result in increased import
substitution.36 The decomposition of output growth shows that import substitution made a
negative contribution to the growth of total expenditure between 1919-20 and 1928-29.37
In marked contrast there was a sharp increase in the contribution of import substitution
between 1928-29 and 1931-32. However, Thomas argues that this resulted more from the
increased competitiveness of Australian manufacturing as domestic costs fell than from
the impact of either the Scullin Tariff or devaluation. Moreover, import substitution
played a negative role during the recovery phase after 1932 up to the outbreak of the war.
He concludes that ‘the contribution of massive import substitution to Australian recovery
appears on such evidence to be a myth.’38
Re-evaluating the Process of Structural Change
Tariffs and profits
Benham and others have argued that the profits of manufacturers rose as tariffs rose.
Local producers, it is alleged, will charge higher prices as tariffs rise because they can be
‘passed on.’39 Increased average revenues are assumed to result in higher profits. This is
not necessarily the case. Let us suppose that imports and domestic products are perfect
substitutes40, and that imports make up 20 per cent of the market. A new tariff of 10 per
cent is imposed on imports that results in zero demand for those products. What is the
appropriate response of the local firms if they are profit-maximizing? Let us also suppose
and ‘Musical instruments’. We have excluded customs revenues gathered for ‘Ale, spirits and beverages’
and ‘Tobacco and preparations thereof’ and ‘Sugar’ as the former two were the equivalent of excise while
the import of sugar was effectively prohibited.
34
The results were statistically significant for four individual industries – bricks, metals, jewellery, and
clothing.
35
Thomas, ‘Manufacturing’, pp. 246-71.
36
Thomas, ‘Manufacturing’, p. 252.
37
Thomas, ‘Manufacturing’, Table 11.2, p. 255.
38
Thomas, “Manufacturing’, p. 255.
39
Brigden, et.al., The Australian Tariff, Part V, ‘Passing on of excess cost’.
40
A questionable assumption. See Thomas, ‘Manufacturing’ pp. 249-51.
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that each firm was in an equilibrium position, with marginal cost and marginal revenues
equal, before the onset of the tariff. How will they respond to the tariff? They can raise
their price to the pre-tariff price plus duty. Demand will fall correspondingly. However,
by taking this action their marginal revenues will rise above marginal costs. Profit
maximizing behaviour will lead each firm to increase its supply back to the pre-tariff
production level so reducing the price. If the new price, with 80 per cent of the pre-tariff
demand being supplied, exceeds the pre-tariff price existing firms in the industry will
have an incentive to increase supply and/or new entrants would start production as long
as they can do so without marginal costs exceeding marginal revenues. Production would
increase to the point where the 20 per cent of the market supplied by imports has been
met locally. The price would fall back to the pre-tariff level as long as there is a
competitive market.
Those making the argument in the 1920s that an increase in tariffs would increase profits
had seen fit to qualify the case. By raising prices after a tariff increase firms would
trigger a subsequent increase in costs. Cost rises were of two sorts. The first came from
the centralized wage system that automatically adjusted the Basic Wage to movements in
price indexes that measured the ‘cost of living’. A combination of higher prices for
imports and domestic goods would feed through into quarterly ‘cost of living’
adjustments.41 Secondly, insofar as firms relied on imported inputs their costs were
increased.42 In its Reports in the 1920s the Tariff Board lamented that firms were using
the increase costs as a rationale for greater protection and expressed alarm at the growing
divergence between money wages in Australian and overseas.43 The impact on the
margins earned by firms of these costs pressures would once again depend on industry
and firm-specific factors. Industries with lower labour-capital ratios would have greater
immunity than labour intensive operations. Moreover, industries will less reliance on
imported inputs were better placed to cope. Whatever the industry effects might be it is
hard to escape the conclusion that the supposed positive stimulus to profits given by
tariffs in the first instance were quickly moderated by these feedback loops.
The impact of tariffs on profitability will depend on industry and firm-specific reactions.
First, the elasticity of supply of the domestic industry matters.44 Competitive industries
are more likely to increase their supply so reducing price below the post-tariff import
price than more highly concentrated ones. Local monopolies can set a price to maximize
profits. Industries with binding cartel agreements could hold prices above competitive
levels after the tariff was imposed. How competitive was Australian manufacturing in the
first four decades of the twentieth century? The prevailing view is that many industries
had high levels of seller concentration and/or engaged in collusive behaviour especially
41

See references in note 23 above.
Roughly three-quarters of imports were producer goods. Thomas, ‘Manufacturing’, p. 266 and notes 14
& 15.
43
Brigden, et.al., The Australian Tariff, Appendix C.
44
‘…the capacity to increase prices differs greatly between …industries. It depends upon the conditions of
supply and demand for the goods produced. Where demand is fairly rigid, and the supply is responsive to
market conditions, the necessary increase in prices may be almost automatic. Differences in conditions of
supply are probably the more important causes of differences in capacity to increase prices to cover the
costs imposed.’ Brigden, et.al., The Australian Tariff, p.53
42
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with respect to price agreements.45 A recent study has found that the increase in seller
concentration in many manufacturing industries before WWII was the result of the
adoption of new technologies that allowed for significant economies of scale.46 Barriers
to entry rose quickly in those industries where firms could reap economics of scale or
establish powerful brands.47 Firms enjoying market power defended their above normal
returns behind barriers to entry that became increasingly difficult for new entrants to
breach. Incumbency delivered more than scale economies in production. That advantage
was reinforced by privileged access to technology through patents or licensing
agreements, registered trade marks and brand acceptance, established relationships with
suppliers and distributors, internally generated competencies gained by experience,
superior organizational design, and privileged access to finance through retained earnings
and the ability to raise debt and equity more cheaply.48 However, these barriers were
breached if the rewards on offer were large enough. There was entry into even highly
concentrated industries such as glass, rubber tyres and confectionary by both foreign and
domestic firms.49 A recent study has shown that profitability and new capital issues, both
in manufacturing and the economy as a whole, followed very similar trajectories through
the interwar period. This would suggest that new investment flowed unimpeded into
profitable industries and products.50
Technological change and changes in labour-capital ratios were commonplace in the
economy. Often the two were associated as technology was embodied in new machinery
that reduced the need for labour or substituted lower cost process workers for craftsmen.
The importance of these developments has been underplayed in the literature, which has
focused its attention on the gap between productivity levels in Australia and overseas.
Our concern is on the impact of such investments on relative profitability amongst firms
within the domestic industry. In such circumstances, competitive advantage amongst
firms within an industry could swing in favour of those undertaking most investment in
new production methods. Firms with lower costs had an incentive to increase supply to
the point where the new equilibrium price was lower than the pre-tariff price. Is there
evidence to support this argument? Colin Forster concluded after a careful review of the
data that ‘although it is impossible to measure with precision the growth of
manufacturing productivity in Australia during the 1920s, general considerations indicate
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that the increase was substantial.’51 Mark Thomas argues that Australian manufacturing
increased in competitiveness vis-a-vis imports in the 1930s through a combination of ‘the
increased efficiency of Australian industry and declining input prices.’52 This resulted in
part from the growth of the local market that permitted the realization of economies of
scale in some industries but, Forster suggests, was insufficient to provide minimum
efficient scale for those capital-intensive and science-based industries of the second
industrial revolution.53 However, new technologies were adopted in many industries that
provided an opportunity for incumbents or entrants to reshape the nature of ‘rivalry’.54
Moreover, there was the substitution of machinery for labour on a large scale across a
wide range of industries. Once again, there were marked differences in the extent and
timing of this process between industries that could explain the reconfiguration of
industry structure.55
Rural industries and the burden of ‘excess costs’
The counter point to the rise of manufacturing was the decline of the farm and mining
industries. The earlier literature makes a clear connection between the two events. Costs
in the export sector were pushed higher because of higher wage and input costs resulting
from tariff protection. Unlike the ‘sheltered’ industries, the exporting rural and mining
industries could not ‘pass on’ higher costs in the world’s commodity markets in which
they were price takers. Primary producers and miners were caught between upward
pressures on costs and a commodity cycle that turned downwards from the mid-1920s
before collapsing in 1929.56
Agricultural economists would predict a relative contraction in the size of the primary
sector over the long term because of the underlying elasticity of demand and supply.57 As
income grows the demand for foodstuffs does not rise proportionately. Freebairn reports
that the estimates for the income elasticity for foodstuffs in Australia range from 0.21 to
0.76.58 This would have been the case in export markets as well. Demand for the products
of Australian’s rural producers and miners grew more slowly as incomes rose at home
and abroad. The prospects facing primary producers turned against them in the inter-war
period as world demand and supply schedules shifted inward and outward, respectively,
turning the terms of trade sharply against them. Demand for wool and mineral products
such as coal and iron ore and non-ferrous metals was hostage to the fortunes facing those
products that used them as inputs. Prices of Australian exports were softened by slower
51
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growth in Western Europe markets in the 1920s and by improvements in efficiency in
production processes. Moreover, an excess of supply entering the world economy in the
1920s precipitated a dramatic drop in prices in 1929 and depressed them for the rest of
the decade.59
Increasing productivity in primary industries meant that demand could be met with a
smaller share of resources, especially labour. Sinclair has argued that the rural frontier
was closing by the 1920s.60 This signaled the end to a century old ‘model’ of economic
development that involved bringing more and more land into production. Declining
rainfall as farmers moved inland set the geographic limits for settlement. Farming
practices, particularly repeated plantings of wheat, was diminishing soil fertility. A
corollary is an inelastic supply schedule with respect to price for Australian farm
products after the 1920s. In contrast, Freebairn presents a more optimistic picture with a
range of technical advances offsetting the caprices of nature.61 The slower expansion in
area under crop in the 1930s would seem to have been the result of falling prices rather
than declining marginal productivity.62
A combination of low income elasticity of demand for primary products and an elastic
supply response can account for a ‘natural’ process of long term decline in the
importance of the sector in the economy. Was this process accelerated by the ‘excess
cost’ imposed by the tariff? Insofar as farmers and miners purchased imported inputs
whose prices were inflated by the tariff, the answer would be in the affirmative.
However, there were a number of offsetting effects. The distribution of the ‘burden’ fell
unevenly amongst the various agricultural and mining industries. In the late 1930s the
majority of farm products exported less than a half of their output, with wool, dried vine
fruits and wheat as the outliers.63 Home price support schemes lifted domestic prices
above export prices for a number of products, most notably dairy products, dried vine
fruits, canned fruits, wine and sugar. The aggregate level of support given to the farm
sector had come to exceed that received by manufacturing in 1932-33.64 It is likely that
this figure rose further as a result of the ‘operation of substantial Commonwealth and
State programs for special financial assistance, bounties, debt adjustment, and reappraisal
of capital values and rentals of crown lands.’65 Rural assistance may have prevented a
faster outflow of resources from the farm sector in the 1930s. Moreover, the mining
industries recovered their position in the economy strongly in the 1930s as a result of the
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rising price of gold and as coal and base metals were subject to higher levels of domestic
demand to generate electricity and feed the furnaces of the metal industries.66
Services: the elephant in the room
As shown in Tables 1 and 2 above, services dominate both the farm sector and
manufacturing in terms of both employment and output with shares of above 40 per cent.
Students of the services sector in advanced economies, beginning with Fischer and Clark,
had argued that this industry would ‘naturally’ expand relative to other sectors because of
its above unity income elasticity of demand and its lower levels of labour productivity.67
As incomes rose, consumers would spend disproportionately on services rather than
foodstuffs or commodities. Moreover, the nature of production of most services, highly
labour intensive and non-storable, would not permit the sorts of productivity increases
occurring elsewhere in the economy. Consequently, the share of employment in the
service sector would be expected to rise more rapidly than its share of product.
One of the key questions we face in discussing structural change in the Australian
economy is the modest growth in services share of output and its constant share of
employment. This leads to a consideration of two issues. The first is the rate at which
incomes and the demand for services grew. A comparison of per capita GDP figures
suggests little growth from the depression of the 1890s until World War II. Butlin refers
to a ‘drastic retardation’ when compared to the earlier and later periods.68 However, this
pessimistic view has been challenged on a number of conceptual and empirical grounds
by other scholars.69 They suggest that GDP has been underestimated because the way it
has been calculated fails to capture the value of the consumption of public sector
infrastructure. Moreover, they point to a number of partial measures that suggest living
standards had risen appreciably such as increased life expectancy, shorter working hours,
earlier retirement ages, better quality housing, higher education attainments and
widespread ownership of consumer durables. Factoring in the effects of alternate
consumption deflators, shorter hours, earlier retirement and increased life expectancy
would substantially life the growth of per capita GDP.70 These upward revisions make the
small growth in the share of services compared to manufacturing all the more puzzling.
66
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The second issue is whether productivity levels were lower and growth rates slower in the
service sector than elsewhere? After a careful review of the issues, Carter concludes that
the ‘evidence does not support the conventional wisdom that service industries on the
whole produce a lower output per worker and have increased their productivity at a lower
rate than manufacturing or agriculture.’71 This view would again provide a partial
explanation for the failure for services, particularly its share of employment, to have
grown relative to the rest of the economy.
Study of changes of the composition of the service industries throw up further
questions.72 Those industries that might be expected to have the highest income elasticity
of demand and low productivity growth, the ‘luxuries’ of restaurants, clubs and hotels,
and personal services and domestic services, stagnated or lost ground. Alternative
explanations to those of income elasticity and low productivity levels are required. Carter
provides two explanations of the demand for services that have differing impacts on the
growth of the sector. The first involves a substitution of goods for services as the relative
prices react to slower productivity growth in services. The examples given are wealthy
households substituting motor cars for public transport and household durables to
substitute for domestic service and entertainment. The availability of an alternate set of
manufactured goods that substitute for service activity, all of which are products of the
second industrial revolution, is a pre-condition for these consumption decisions whose
net effect is to slow the growth of the service sector. By way of contrast, the expansion
of services to businesses and government for intermediate rather than final demand
purposes drove the growth of the service sector independently of income elasticity or
productivity. The growth of business services in the broad was ‘simply a result of
increasing specialization and division of labour.’73
The role of the government as a provider of services also helps to explain the size and
composition of the industry. Political decisions led to increasing state outlays on service
such as the provision of public administration, health and educational services, the
gradual ‘nationalization’ of water and sewerage, power and gas, and urban transport
systems. Moreover, public sector investment rose significantly compared to private nonresidential investment, reflecting commitments to both rural and increasingly urban
needs, infrastructure in the latter being a lagged response to population growth and
industrialization.74 However, industry classifications used by Butlin in his estimations of
GDP make it impossible to distinguish between publicly and privately provided
services.75
An Alternative Explanation of Structural Change
The existing literature provides a gloomy picture of the Australian economy in the first
four decades of the twentieth century. It had been subject to strong cyclical effects, two
71
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depressions and a war. Moreover, its trend rate of per capita growth was disappointing.
Part of the reason for this was because public policy shifted resources towards industries
with lower productivity than the export oriented rural industries. Australia’s competitive
position in the international economy was weakened as productivity in its manufacturing
was well below that of its trading partners. Insult was added to injury as the protection of
manufacturing imposed greater costs on the rural industries so disadvantaging them in
export markets.
An alternative view is that the Australian economy was dynamic in that entrepreneurs
and business people responded to the many opportunities presented to them. Our
contention is that the nature of the Australian economy was markedly different in 1939
from what it had been in 1900. The range of goods and services on offer was far wider.
Changes in consumption patterns provided opportunities for firms to develop new
markets, Edith Penrose’s interstices.76 The technologies underpinning production and
distribution were far more advanced. Cost functions were realigned by the adoption of
new technology, much of which was labour saving. Changes in demand and supply
schedules across the economy prompted firms to adjust their behaviours in an attempt to
lift profitability or to ward off failure. Shifts in demand and supply factors were played
out in thousands of micro-markets in which firms competed. Factors exogenous to the
firms were responsible for some of the shifts in both the demand and supply schedules.
However, firms increasingly built the capabilities to influence the demand for their
products through branding and advertising, and to create superior production
technologies. The resultant effect on changes in demand and supply factors over time was
reflected in a shifting in relative profitability between industries down to very narrow
product categories.
Modern Consumerism
A number of powerful drivers of change can be identified on the demand side. There was
a strong demonstration effect from the United States and the United Kingdom about what
was on offer. Australians wanted to experience what was new and different. The 1920s in
particular was a decade of experimentation. Expenditure patterns shifted under the weight
of three forces: a growing demand for consumer durables; a growing preference for
entertainment and leisure activities; and the emergence of a new category of expenditure,
fast moving consumer goods.
Australian consumers and producers were aware of the new consumer products,
particularly consumer durables, coming onto markets in North America and Europe after
WWI. Immigrants brought this personal knowledge with them. Australian residents saw
this ‘new’ world through the medium of letters from relatives living abroad, newspapers,
magazines and cinema and in shop windows. They observed the purchases of their family
and friends. What might have seemed unobtainable luxuries became necessities for more
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and more families under the siren call of advertising.77 Household budgets were
rearranged in the light of an expanding set of products and services.
The decade of the 1920s has been identified as the beginning of Australia’s progress to
becoming ‘a modern consumer society.’78 A sufficient number of households possessed
the discretionary income to purchase motor cars and a range of household appliances.
Hire purchase facilities allowed the cost to be spread over a number of years. Whitwell
argues that these expenditures rose rapidly in the second half of the decade before falling
away in the depression and war. The extraordinary growth of consumer spending after
1945 was the start of a new era rather than a continuation of a longer process.79 However,
there are a range of indicators to suggest that the demand for consumer durables
continued strongly throughout the 1930s. For instance, the sale of radios quickened
markedly. In 1929 there was one radio licence for every 20 people. Within a decade the
number had risen to one in six. The number of telephones in use also rose from one in
every 12 people in 1929 to one in every ten by 1939. Motor car sales continued to grow
throughout the 1930s. The number of motor vehicles registered, including motor cars,
commercial vehicles and motor cycles, rose from one for every 12 people to one in every
eight and a half. More people were driving. The number of people licensed to drive rose
from one in every 43 in 1919, to one in every eight in 1929 and to one in every six in
1939. They drove further during the 1930s with the volume of petrol consumed rising
faster than the number of registered vehicles, 75 compared to 50 per cent.80
The increased consumption of motor vehicles and household consumer durables such as
radios, washing machines, refrigerators, vacuum cleaners and the like necessarily lagged
behind investments in the construction of sealed roads and the provision of electricity and
gas. State and local governments made those investments on a large scale in the 1920s
and 1930s.81 Private providers had also entered the energy sector from the late nineteenth
century. A hybrid system of state and private providers continued up to WWII but the
government utilities absorbed many of the smaller private firms. An increasing number of
households were connected to gas and electricity. Whitwell reports that 34 per cent of
homes in Australia had electricity in 1923 and that the number rose sharply later in the
decade.82 Further growth was experienced in the 1930s. By 1939 all the electricity
providers in Victoria, the SECV and the rest, had 397,944 customers, in an area that held
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85 per cent of the State’s population. 83 The number connected was more than threequarters of all the dwellings, shops and factories in the state.84 The 1947 Census confirms
an almost complete coverage of private houses in the metropolitan cities, 97 per cent of
houses were connected to electricity. 83 per cent were connected to gas, and nearly threequarters used a gas stove.85 Nationwide, 78 per cent of private dwellings had electricity;
just two points shy of the figure for the United States of America in 1941.86
There was a growing market for electrical appliances which provided opportunities for
local producers and distributors. A substantial electrical manufacturing industry had been
established in the 1920s.87 It continued to expand in the 1930s as sales of washing
machines, vacuum cleaners, refrigerators and gas cookers and heaters continued to grow.
The market was served by a combination of local manufacturers, many of whom were
foreign owned, and importers. The distribution channels ranged from door to door
salesmen, to specialist stores and department stores. Hire purchase or some form of
vendor finance was common for the more expensive items.88
Consumption patterns altered in the face of rising incomes, the advent of new
technologies and shorter hours. More was spent on entertainment and leisure pursuits.
Two illustrations suffice to make the point. First, the popular entertainments of the
nineteenth century, the circus, music hall and live theatre, were challenged by the arrival
of the cinema in the 1920s. The speed with which it became a mass medium is
astonishing.89 By 1927 there were 1,250 theatres that had sold 110 million tickets that
year. Gross receipts were £5.5 million. Investment in the theatres was estimated to be £25
million and 20,000 people worked in the industry.90 Sport and recreation played an
increasingly important part in Australian life. School children were dragooned into
organized physical activity. Participation was fostered through school, church,
neighbourhood and district competitions covering every sport from archery to volley ball.
Their parents might choose fishing, sailing, bowls or golf. Recreational activity became
institutionalized with state and national organizations taking charge in all of the major
sporting codes. Sport became mass entertainment as attendances at football matches, test
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cricket and racing rose.91 Much of the infrastructure was provided by local government
and churches. However, there were plenty of opportunities left for businessmen.92 The
demand for sporting equipment and specialized apparel including footwear grew.93 Large
crowds at cricket grounds, boxing stadiums and race tracks required transport, food and
drink, and at the latter, gambling facilities. Posters, tickets and programs gave additional
work to printers and newspapers’ sports sections feed the public’s demand for results and
information.
Fast moving consumer goods became an important part of expenditure patterns after
WWI. Until that time the category would have been confined to a small range of
products, cigarettes, pipe tobacco, toiletries and confectionery. The list lengthened in the
1920s and 1930s to include cosmetics such as face creams, lipstick, nail polish,94
toothpaste and over the counter drugs such as ‘Aspro’.95 Confectionery also became big
business as the homemade or unbranded sweets of pre-WWI were replaced by branded
chocolates and toffees, and chewing gum. The soft drink market was transformed by the
adoption of the crown seal and commercial refrigeration.96 Children became important
consumers in their own right, not only through their expenditures of pocket money but as
a new segment in the food market. The first wave of convenience foods for breakfast,
cereals, school lunches, vegemite and processed cheese, and after school and bed time
snacks, ice cream, milk chocolate and cocoa came from the giant foreign food
corporations of Kellogg’s, Kraft, Nestle, Cadbury’s and the local Peters.97 These types of
products, along with canned fruit and baked beans, came in new and improved forms of
packaging.
Supply Side Shifts
The economy was also experiencing a number of important changes on the supply side
that would in turn disturb existing equilibrium positions. Three will be considered briefly
below. The first is the marked increase in specialization of function; the second is a
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refashioning of distribution channels; and the third is the growing importance of
intellectual property as a firm resource and as a source of competitive advantage.
The expansion of the economy in the first half of the twentieth century permitted
increased specialization of function across the board. Butlin argues that the ‘gradual
separation’ of the ‘institutional combination of manufacturing, trade and transport
function, the confusion of rural production, construction, transport and selling activities’
was a ‘basic feature of pre-1914 and interwar growth.’ This might, a priori, ‘enlarge
opportunities for increased efficiency.’98 Specialization could reduce costs independent of
scale as firms improve efficiency as a result of cumulative experience.99 Evidence of the
growth in specialization can be found in trade directories. Here firms advertise their
wares to buyers. A review of the ‘Index to professions and trades Melbourne and
suburbs’ in the Sands & McDougall’s Directory of Victoria100 in 1920, 1930 and 1939
reveals significant change. There were 48 new categories in the 1930 edition compared to
1920, and another 218 categories in 1939 compared to 1930. The new entrants were
spread across services and manufacturing. The professions splintered into highly
specialist groups, particularly amongst chemists and engineers. Specialist intermediaries
and wholesalers abounded, including the valuers and auctioneers making a market in
second hand machinery. The list of manufacturing trades show the rapid emergence of
new industries such as air conditioning, Christmas cards, gramophone records, ice cream
cones and wafers, hearing aids and spectacles.
This process of specialization was particularly evident in wholesale and retail
distribution. The role of the importing wholesaler, once the most important conduit
between Australian retailers and their foreign suppliers, was diminishing. The tariff
played its part. However, many of the larger retailers, particularly the department stores,
established their own buying offices abroad.101 Increasingly, these large metropolitan
city-based stores either integrated backwards into production or formed close links with
domestic producers in relationships that exhibited considerable countervailing power.
Sidney Myer’s store in Bourke Street, Melbourne, borrowing freely from models in the
United States, became the pace setter for department stores in the 1920s and 1930s. New
types of specialist retailer were emerging. Chain stores such as Moran and Cato in
groceries, O.Gilpin’s in drapery and ironmongery, and G. J. Coles in variety goods were
well advanced before 1939.102 The expanding use of the motor car brought dealerships,
garages selling petrol and providing repairs, and used car lots in its wake. The general
store was challenged by specialist retailers, such as grocers, Manchester, hardware and
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home wares.103 The clothing stores segmented the market into women’s and men’s
clothes, and youths and children. Moreover, hats, corsets, fur coats, gloves and shoes for
women would be sold in different establishments. Purchases were driven by events such
as parties and weddings, the changing season and fashions rather than need. New forms
of food retailers started to trade in the 1930s, delicatessens, soda fountains and the soon
to be ubiquitous milk bar.104
Additions to capital stock have figured prominently in the explanations of output and
productivity growth before WWII.105 It is important to also recognize the growing
importance of intellectual property to firms. Knowledge and know how was embedded in
organizational routines.106 Australian firms imported technology on a large scale, a
process that often included the transfer of machinery, blue prints and skilled workers to
assemble and train the local operatives. Examples can be drawn from steel, glass and
fertilizer industries.107 Businesses sought exclusive access to their own technology
through patents and to imported technology and the products it could make through the
licensing agreements. Products were branded and heavily promoted where ever possible.
Firms registered trade marks and paid fees to foreign firms use their trade marks on
products made under licence to protect their property rights. These intangible assets were
a source of competitive advantage to firms and a source of barriers to entry and mobility
in many industries. Further, their existence was a factor contributing to differing rates of
profits between and within industries.108
Changes in demand or in supply conditions had widespread repercussions across the
economy. The point is most simply made with reference to motor cars and electricity.
The growing demand for motor cars affected a number of up stream industries other than
car companies such as oil companies, road construction contractors, suppliers of
aggregate and asphalt, manufacturers and installers of tariff signals. Consumption of
motor cars generated a new class of insurance risk, signaling increased competition
within the insurance industry, and spurred the development of the hire purchase industry.
Down stream garages sprang up to provide fuel, service and repair cars, with panel
beaters and spray painters emerging as separate entities. Used car yards, wreckers and
scrap metal merchants dealt with the older models. Motorists formed associations that
vigorously promoted their interests against competing users of road space.109 Commercial
users of motor trucks, buses and cars arose apace. The truck became a major source of
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transport in the 1930s, while bus and taxi fleets110 also expanded. Electricity generation
had a pervasive impact on the economy. It reached back to the domestic coal mining
industry as a source of energy and spawned hydroelectric schemes. Heavy engineering
met its needs for both generation and transmission. Power was essential for the expansion
of the telephone network, which had its own feedback loop to business productivity by
reducing communication costs. Power to factories greatly increased their productivity. In
the 1930s many small tools such as drills and grinders, once hand tools, were fixed to a
bench and power driven. The capacity of pumps and compressors also increased.111
Electricity transformed offices by being used for lighting, lifts, hot water systems, air
conditioning, refrigeration, and to power office equipment such as calculating machines.
By the late 1930s electrical appliances had invaded every room in the house. The State
Electricity Commission of Victoria, for instance, boasted that there were 21 types of
equipment other than lighting available.112
Conclusion
If we shift our attention from the issues of Australia’s comparative advantage and its
costs and productivity relative to those of its trading partners a different picture emerges.
During the first four decades of the twentieth century the economy added to its stock of
resources: labour, capital and technology or know how. The allocation of these resources
within the economy altered significantly, manufacturing grew, the rural sector shrank by
the same amount and the tertiary sector remained roughly constant. The question is what
motivated this reallocation. The conventional story has been one of tariffs and subsidies
interfering with relative prices. We contend that this is at best a partial explanation as it
applies only to the ‘tradeable’ sector of the economy. The size and composition of the
large tertiary sector remains unexplained. Moreover, the tariffs and subsidies story does
not provide a convincing explanation of how profits in manufacturing would rise both
absolutely and relatively after an increase in the tariff.
McLean and Pincus offered the tantalizing comment that ‘there is the possibility that the
nature of economic growth [between 1890 and 1940] was different from that in the
preceding and subsequent periods of much faster growth…’113 We would agree that the
process of growth is not well understood. Our contention is that new opportunities for
profitable investment were becoming available in many parts of the economy because of
changes on the demand and supply side. Many of these changes were exogenous to
Australia. The demonstration effect was strong for both households and businesses.
Information about new products and services, and the technology required to produce
them flowed freely into the country. Households shifted their preferences towards
consumer durables, entertainment and leisure and fast moving consumer goods. These
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decisions were at the heart of Snooks’114 discussion of the changing boundaries between
household and total economy. Up to WWII households were increasingly ‘buying’ goods
and services that were previously produced and consumed within the family unit. Large
scale investment in public infrastructure was a precondition that had been largely met by
the mid-1920s. Increased profits awaited those firms first to market or who could develop
a sustainable competitive advantage. Changes on the supply side such as the efficiency
gains associated with specialization, new distribution channels to satisfy customer
demands and a growing reliance on inimitable proprietary assets provide additional or
complementary paths to profitable investments. Finally, we argue that the outcomes of
these shifts in both demand and supply had large scale linkage effects across the
economy.
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Table 1. Shares of employment by sector [per cent]
Primary
Manufacturing
Services
Tertiary
1900-01
33.0
14.7
42.3
52.3
1910-11
30.5
18.8
41.1
50.7
1926-27
24.0
20.5
42.0
55.4
1937-38
23.9
23.5
42.0
52.6
Note: Mining is included in Primary. Tertiary is Services plus Construction.
Source: Dowie (1970), Table 5.4, p. 231.
Table 2: Share of product by sector at current prices [per cent]
Primary
Manufacturing
Services
Tertiary
1900-01
36.6
12.9
42.9
50.5
1910-11
32.9
14.5
44.4
52.6
1926-27
26.4
16.4
46.6
57.3
1937-38
28.2
18.0
45.5
53.8
Notes: Data from ‘Butlin’ column. Mining is included in Primary. Tertiary is Services
plus Construction.
Source: Dowie (1970), Table 5.5, p. 234.
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Appendix 1
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R
0.207183
R Square
0.042925
Adjusted R
Square
0.030164
Standard Error
1.337281
Observations
77
ANOVA
df
Regression
Residual
Total

Intercept
logRate

1
75
76

SS
6.01548
134.124
140.1395

Coefficients
3.561129
1.015745

Standard
Error
1.860543
0.553824

MS
6.01548
1.788321

F
3.363759

Significance
F
0.070612

t Stat
1.914027
1.834055

P-value
0.059432
0.070612

Lower 95%
-0.14526
-0.08753

Upper
95%
7.26752
2.11902
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Lower
95.0%
-0.14526
-0.08753

Upp
95.0
7.2
2.1

Appendix II
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R
0.96821741
R Square
0.937444954
Adjusted R Square
0.867939347
Standard Error
5657.552561
Observations
20
ANOVA
df
Regression
Residual
Total

SS
MS
F
Significance F
10 4.32E+09 4.32E+08 13.48733 0.000295
9 2.88E+08 32007901
19 4.61E+09

Coefficients
Intercept
duty %
bricks
drugs
metals
jewelley
clothing
leather
food
wood
paper
musical instrument

12367.14979
-88.1878486
-11267.4821
-4473.7254
38326.99181
-11596.3988
13162.06486
-4111.42564
-12.2057969
-1543.95037
-5081.73421
13402.1343

Standard
t Stat
P-value
Lower
Upper
Lower
Upper
Error
95%
95%
95.0%
95.0%
1318.409 9.38036 6.08E-06 9384.702 15349.6 9384.702 15349.6
124.5716 -0.70793 0.496912 -369.988 193.6128 -369.988 193.6128
3800.142 -2.96502 0.01583
-19864 -2670.96
-19864 -2670.96
4693.702 -0.95313 0.365418 -15091.6 6144.166 -15091.6 6144.166
3811.946 10.05444 3.42E-06 29703.77 46950.21 29703.77 46950.21
3803.952 -3.04851 0.013826 -20201.5 -2991.26 -20201.5 -2991.26
3798.682 3.464903 0.007106 4568.85 21755.28 4568.85 21755.28
3810.575 -1.07895 0.308675 -12731.5 4508.695 -12731.5 4508.695
3798.655 -0.00321 0.997506 -8605.36 8580.949 -8605.36 8580.949
3850.401 -0.40098 0.697785 -10254.2 7166.262 -10254.2 7166.262
3844.372 -1.32186 0.218824 -13778.3 3614.838 -13778.3 3614.838
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Chart 2. Average rate of duty on dutiable imports, 1903-39
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